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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Ginger Key has challenged on appeal several aspects of the criminal forfeiture
order entered against her. This Reply Brief is necessary to clarify the specific nature of
her arguments on appeal, as opposed to the characterizations of these arguments in
the State's Respondents Brief, as well as to provide further clarification of the applicable
law governing these issues.
Specifically, this brief is necessary to first clarify that Ms. Key's arguments
regarding the violation of her right to a jury trial are allegations of a fundamental with
regard to violations of her important and fundamental constitutional rights. While there
may be attendant issues of the constitutionality of statutory provisions purporting to
eliminate these rights, any issue regarding the constitutionality of the statute is collateral
to, and pendant upon, her claims of fundamental error.
In addition, the State's arguments regarding whether there is a constitutional right
to a jury trial pursuant to the ldaho State Constitution fail to address any issue of
whether there was a right to jury trial for the specific type of action at issue in this appeal

- statutory criminal forfeiture

actions. To the extent that the State makes arguments

about unrelated proceedings, the State's arguments are inapposite to this case. A
review of pertinent case law and histories regarding the type of proceeding at issue
reveal that statutory forfeiture actions very clearly were tried to juries at common law.
Given this, Ms. Key had a constitutional right to a jury trial in the criminal forfeiture
action in this case under the ldaho State Constitution.

With regard to her Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, this Reply Brief is
necessary to clarify that, under a proper application of the U.S. Supreme Court opinions
in Blakely and Apprendi, Ms. Key likewise had a Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
While Ms. Key acknowledges that some federal cases have reached a contrary
conclusion, she submits that these opinions were erroneously decided.
The State has further asserted that the proportionality findings required prior to
entering a forfeiture order for property are only required when the property at issue is
real property because personal property such as a car is generally not divisible. This
exact argument has been considered and rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in the
context of civil forfeiture proceedings, and therefore it should be rejected by this Court.
Ms. Key continues to assert that the district court's order forfeiting her vehicle
violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines and that the district
court abused its discretion when it found that her car was used to commit or facilitate
her offense. However, she will rely on the arguments contained in her Appellant's Brief
in support of her contentions, and will not reiterate those arguments herein.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously
articulated in Ms. Key's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief,
but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

ISSUES
1.

Are Ms. Key's claims regarding the violation of her right to a jury trial under the
State and federal constitution properly justiciable as allegations of a fundamental
error that is reviewable by this Court for the first time on appeal?

2.

Was Ms. Key's constitutional right to a jury trial, pursuant to Article 1, § 7 of the
Idaho State Constitution, violated when the issue of whether the State was
entitled to forfeiture of Ms. Key's vehicle was tried before the district court judge,
despite the fact that Ms. Key never waived her right to a jury determination of this
issue?

3.

Was Ms. Key's constitutional right to a jury trial, pursuant to the Sixth
Amendment of the United States constitution, violated when the issue of whether
the State was entitled to forfeiture of Ms. Key's vehicle was tried before the
district court judge, despite the fact that Ms. Key never waived her right to a jury
determination of this issue?

4.

Did the district court err when it failed to make a determination, pursuant to
I.C.§37-2809, whether the size of the property forfeited was unfairly
disproportionate to the size of the property actually used in the commission of
Ms. Key's underlying offense?

ARGUMENT
I.
Ms. Key's Claims Reaardina The Violation Of Her Right To A Jurv Trial Under The State
And Federal Constitution Are Properlv Justiciable As Alleaations Of A Fundamental
Error That Is Reviewable Bv This Court For The First Time On Appeal
A.

Introduction
Ms. Key's constitutional claims regarding a violation of her right to a jury trial

under the State and federal constitution are properly justiciable as claims of a
fundamental error based upon the violation of her fundamental constitutional rights, and
these claims were never waived as part of Ms. Key's guilty plea to the underlying
offense of possession of marijuana.

6.

Ms. Kev's Claims Reqardinq The Violation Of Her Riaht To A Jurv Trial Under
The State And Federal Constitution Are Properlv Justiciable As Alieaations Of A
Fundamental Error That Is Reviewable By This Court For The First Time On
Appeal
As Ms. Key noted in her Appellant's Brief, the deprivation of the right to a jury trial

constitutes an error that infringes upon one of the most central of fundamental rights
enjoyed by defendants.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.10-11.)

Indeed, the United States

Supreme Court has already held that the denial of the right to jury trial is such a critical
error that this deprivation can rise to the level of a structural error. See Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279-280 (1993).
While the State attempts to recast this assertion as a general claim of infirmity of
the statute that purports to eliminate the right to jury trial in criminal forfeiture actions,
I.C. § 37-2801(2), at base, this claim merely misapprehends or mischaracterizes the
actual issue on appeal. Ms. Key's actual assertion is based upon a direct violation of

her personal constitutional rights, and is not an abstract assertion that I.C. § 37-2801(2)
is unconstitutional. (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-18.) Ms. Key concedes that this statute is
pertinent to the issues regarding her right to a jury trial insofar as the statute has
language that there is no right to a jury trial. Because the language of this statute is
germane to the issue of a right to a jury trial in criminal forfeiture proceedings, this
statute was briefly noted in Ms. Key's Appellant's Brief.

(Appellant's Brief, p.13.)

However, regardless of the language of this statute, Ms. Key's constitutional right to a
jury trial would trump any contrary language in the statute; and therefore the statutory
language is in no way dispositive of the analysis and outcome in this case. See ldaho
Dep't. of Law Enforcement v. Free, 126 ldaho 422,427, 885 P.2d 381, 386 (1994).
Additionally, the State appears to suggest (albeit in a footnote) that Ms. Key had
waived her right to a jury determination on the issue of forfeiture by virtue of entering a
guilty plea as to the underlying offense. (Respondent's Brief, p.7 n.1.) This argument is
contradicted by the record in this case. Under her plea agreement, Ms. Key expressly
resewed the right to challenge the State's request for forfeiture of her vehicle.
(R., p.81.) Therefore, Ms. Key never waived her right to any challenge regarding the
issue of the forfeiture of her vehicle. Beyond this, Ms. Key was never informed that she
had a separate right to a jury determination on the issue of forfeiture, and therefore this
record does not show any knowing, intelligent, or voluntary waiver of her right to jury
trial specifically with regard to forfeiture. See, e.g., State v. Weber, 140 ldaho 89, 95,
90 P.3d 314, 320 (2004).

Ms. Kev's Constitutional Riaht To A Jury Trial, Pursuant To Article 1, 6 7 Of The ldaho
State Constitution, Was Violated When The lssue Of Whether The State Was Entitled
To Forfeiture Of Ms. Kev's Vehicle Was Tried Before The District Court Judae, Despite
The Fact That Ms. Kev Never Waived Her Riqht To A Jury Determination Of This lssue
A,

Introduction
The State in this case erroneously relies on precedent that is limited to

sentencing proceedings in arguing that there is no right at common law to a jury
determination in statutory forfeiture actions, and therefore no right to jury trial in
Ms. Key's case pursuant to the ldaho State Constitution.

The State's analysis,

however, fails to comply with the requisite methodology for determining whether the
right to a jury trial existed at common law - it is not the modern label or categorization of
the action that defines whether such a right existed, but rather whether the general
nature of the action was recognized in common law courts. Under a proper application
of the analytical standard, and in light of pertinent case law setting forth the historical
pedigree of statutory forfeiture actions, Ms. Key had a right to a jury determination of the
facts necessary to support an order of criminal forfeiture pursuant to Article 1, § 7 of the
ldaho State Constitution.
B.

Ms. Kev's Constitutional Riqht To A Jurv Trial, Pursuant To Article 1, 6 7 Of The
ldaho State Constitution. Was Violated When The lssue Of Whether The State
Was Entitled To Forfeiture Of Ms. Key's Vehicle Was Tried Before The District
Court Judqe, Despite The Fact That Ms. Kev Never Waived Her Riqht To A Jury
Determination Of This lssue
As an initial matter, at various points during the State's argument regarding

Ms. Key's claims of a right to jury trial under the ldaho constitution, the State appears to
invoke the standards for a right to jury trial under the Sixth Amendment of the federal

constitution.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.10-13.)

However, these standards are very

different. The Sixth Amendment guarantee of a right to jury trial, by its terms, is limited
to criminal prosecutions. U.S. Const. amend. Vl. In contrast, the right to jury trial in
criminal matters under the ldaho constitution is defined by whether there was a
constitutional right to a jury trial for that action at common law at the time the ldaho
Constitution was adopted. See Sfafe v. Bennion, 112 ldaho 32, 37, 730 P.2d 952, 957
(1986).

This is similar to the provisions of the Seventh Amendment of the U.S.

Constitution, which provides a civil right to jury trial for all actions that could have been
brought in common law courts.
The ldaho constitutional standard for defining whether there is a constitutional
right to a jury trial in civil or criminal actions is therefore more reflective of the federal
standard for a right to jury trial in civil actions under the Seventh Amendment - it is
defined by whether the nature of the action was one that could have been brought by
suit at common law. Bennion, 112 ldaho at 37, 730 P.2d at 957; U.S. Const. amend.
VII.

And the U.S. Supreme Court has already recognized that statutory forfeiture

actions were actions at common law to which the right to jury trial attached. Austin v.
U.S., 509 U.S. 602, 611-612 (1993).
Regardless of whether the forfeiture actions were deemed in personam
(punishment against the defendant) or in rem (punishment of the property), forfeiture
actions for property taken on land were tried in common law courts and not at equity.
See U.S.

V.

Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 332 n.7 (1998) (recognizing that modern criminal

forfeiture statutes were "an innovative attempt to call on our common law heritage to
meet an essentially modern problem"). The Oregon Supreme Court Opinion of Sfafe v.

1920 Studebaker Touring Car is particularly instructive for this Court on this point. See
State V. 1920 Studebaker Touring Car, 251 P. 701 (1926)
Oregon, like Idaho, has preserved the right to jury trial under its state constitution
based upon the status of the common law at the time the constitution was adopted.' Id.
at 703. As noted by the court in 1920 Studebaker Touring Car:
There can be no doubt that at the time of the adoption of our state
Constitution, in cases where the seizure was made on land, property such
as a "boat, vehicle or other conveyance," could not be forfeited by way of
penalty or punishment for the violation of law, except in actions triable by
jury. Where a proceeding is authorized which may result in a judgment
that operates upon the property of the individual, either by way of forfeiture
or by means of execution, the uniform rule of law has always been that,
before such judgment can pass, the individual is entitled to a jury trial,
unless he waives the same. We regard it equally clear that suits to
enforce forfeitures or penalties have been generally tried by a jury.

Id. (internal citation omitted).
In addition, the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1972 Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 7 discussed the common law pedigree of
criminal forfeiture actions as it related to the provision of a statutory right to jury trial in
federal criminal forfeiture proceedings. The Advisory Committee noted that, "Under the
common law, in a criminal forfeiture proceeding the defendant was apparently entitled to
notice, trial, and a special jury finding on the factual issues surrounding the declaration
of forfeiture which followed his criminal conviction." See Advisory Committee Notes to
the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 7, F.R.Cr.P.
32.2. Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized on numerous occasions that

The Oregon constitution was adopted in 1859. See State v. Moyer, 200 P.3d 619, 634
(Or. Ct. App. 2009).

forfeiture upon conviction for a felony was a forfeiture action at common law. See, e.g.,
Austin, 509 U.S. at 611-612 (1993).
While modern forfeiture actions, and specifically ldaho statutory criminal
forfeiture actions, are more limited in scope than their historical counterparts (in ldaho,
the State may only obtain forfeiture for property actually used in the commission of the
offense under I.C. Zj 37-2809), this does not change that the fundamental nature of the
action had its roots in common law, where the right to jury trial existed. As noted by the
Bennion Court:
The constitutional right of trial by jury is not to be narrowly construed. It is
not limited strictly to those cases in which it existed before the adoption of
the Constitution but is extended to cases of like nature as may afterwards
arise.
Bennion, 112 ldaho at 37, 730 P.2d at 957 (quoting People v. One 1941 Chevrolet
Coupe, 231 P.2d 832,844 (1951))
Contrary to the implication made by the State, the common law right to jury trial
existed for both in personam forfeiture actions and in rem forfeiture actions. (See
Respondent's Brief, p.12.) Because this right to jury trial has always been recognized at
common law, Ms. Key had a constitutional right to a jury trial of the criminal forfeiture
action in this case pursuant to Article 1, § 7 of the ldaho State Constitution.
The case of In re Dawson, relied on as primary authority by the State, is
inapposite to the issue before this Court and does not stand for the propositions cited.
In Dawson, the issue for the court's resolution was whether a defendant could waive the
jury's determination of guilt through entering a guilty plea. Dawson, 20 ldaho 178, 117
P. 696, 697-700 (1911). Because the plea of guilt left no remaining triable issues for the

jury, the Dawson Court held that a guilty plea was sufficient to constitute a conviction

even in absence of a jury determination of guilt. Id. The Dawson case does nothing to
elucidate whether statutory criminal forfeiture actions were tried to juries at common
law, and therefore this opinion is irrelevant to the issues in this case
Under pertinent case law and legal authorities regarding forfeiture actions at
common law, it is clear that there was a right to jury trial for both in rem and in
personam forfeiture actions. The State's suggestion to the contrary is without merit.

Ms. Key's Constitutional Right To A Jurv Trial. Pursuant To The Sixth Amendment Of
The United States Constitution, Was Violated When The lssue Of Whether The State
Was Entitled To Forfeiture Of Ms. Kev's Vehicle Was Tried Before The District Court,
D
e
s
p
i
t
e Determination Of
This lssue
A.

Introduction
Under the pertinent definition of what constitutes the "statutory maximum" for an

offense, the holdings of Blakely v. Washington and Apprendi v. New Jersey would apply
to criminal forfeiture proceedings as set forth by statute in Idaho because these
proceedings require specific factual findings and further operate to increase the
statutory maximum punishment that is available to the State. To the extend that other
jurisdictions have found that Blakely and Apprendi do not apply to criminal forfeiture
actions, those cases were erroneously decided and should be given no weight by this
Court.

B.

Ms. Key's Constitutional Riaht To A Jury Trial, Pursuant To The Sixth
Amendment Of The United States Constitution, Was Violated When The lssue Of
Whether The State Was Entitled To Forfeiture Of Ms. Kev's Vehicle Was Tried
Before The District Court, Despite The Fact That Ms. Key Never Waived Her
Riaht To A Jury Determination Of This lssue
In response to Ms. Key's assertion that the district court violated her

constitutional right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by
failing to inform Ms. Key of her right to a jury trial on the forfeiture action and failing to
obtain a waiver of this right, the State has argued that there is no Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial in light of persuasive precedent. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-10.) In
making this argument, the State relies primarily of case law from federal courts that
have addressed claims that are similar to that raised by Ms. Key on appeal
(Respondent's Brief, pp.7-10.) Ms. Key asserts that this Court should not rely on this
precedent, as those cases are erroneously decided
It is clear that, for purposes of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a jury trial,
"Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt."

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004);

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The U.S. Supreme Court has
defined the term "statutory maximum" as:

... the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the
facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. In other
words, the relevant "statutory maximum" is not the maximum sentence a
judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum
sentence he may impose without any additional findings. When a judge
inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has
not found all the facts "which the law makes essential to the punishment."
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-304.

From the outset, it is important to note that criminal forfeiture is indisputably
considered punishment.

See Librefti v. U.S., 516 U.S. 29, 39 (1995).

It is also

apparent, by their definitions, that forfeiture operates as an independent punishment
than incarceration - one is a taking of liberty and one is a taking of property. Therefore,
provisions that authorize forfeiture as a punishment for a criminal offense are
authorizing additional punishments than mere incarceration.
Admittedly, general considerations of mitigating and aggravating evidence in
indeterminate sentencing schemes do not fall within the scope of the holding of Blakely
and Apprendi; largely because there is nothing that requires the district court to make
these findings when imposing sentence

- they

are merely guidelines. See State v.

Stover, 140 ldaho 927, 931, 104 P.3d 969, 973 (2005).

In contrast, the statutory

scheme that applies in ldaho with regard to criminal forfeiture actions requires very
specific factual findings before the property can be deemed forfeited to the State. The
district court must make a finding of the requisite nexus between the property and the
criminal activity

- i.e.

that the property was actually used to commit or facilitate the

-

offense -and the finding of proportionality i.e. that the property forfeited is not unfairly
disproportionate to size of the property actually used in committing the offense. See
I.C.

$3

37-2801, 37-2809. Given this, the statutory framework in ldaho for criminal

forfeiture does not reflect the salient features of an indeterminate sentencing scheme,
and Blakely and Apprendi apply to Idaho's statutory scheme of criminal forfeiture.
The factual findings that are statutorily mandated in order to enter a criminal
forfeiture in ldaho are findings that are beyond the scope of the underlying facts that
support a finding of guilt of the charges offense, and these facts increase the

punishment that is otherwise available based solely upon a finding of guilt. Under the
plain language of Blakely and Apprendi, a defendant has the Sixth Amendment right to
a jury determination of any facts that are necessary to support criminal forfeiture.
IV.
The District Court Erred When It Failed To Make A Determination, Pursuant To
1.C. 5 37-2809, Whether The Size Of The Property Forfeited Was Unfairly
Disproportionate To The Size Of The Property Actually Used In The Commission Of
Ms. Key's Underlying Offense
A.

Introduction
The State has asserted that, because Ms. Key's vehicle is personal property, and

therefore not divisible, the proportionality determination mandated under I.C. § 37-2809
does not apply.

This argument has been considered and rejected by the ldaho

Supreme Court in Free, and this Court should do the same.
B.

The District Court Erred When It Failed To Make A Determination, Pursuant To
I.C. 5 37-2809, Whether The Size Of The Property Forfeited Was Unfairly
Disproportionate To The Size Of The Propertv Actually Used In The Commission
Of Ms. Key's Underlvinq Offense
The State argues at length, but with no actual citation to any legal authority, that

the proportionality finding required by I.C. § 37-2809 prior to the entry of a forfeiture
order is not required when the property at issue is personal property because personal
property is generally not divisible. As an initial matter, this Court will not consider
arguments that are not supported by any legal authority. See State v. Zichko, 129
ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). But, more important for this Court, the ldaho
Supreme Court has already considered and rejected this argument in the context of civil
forfeiture proceedings.

The pertinent provision of the civil forfeiture statutes, I.C. § 37-2744A, is virtually
identical in substance to the criminal forfeiture proportionality statute at issue, I.C. § 372809. The property that was forfeited under the civil forfeiture proceedings in Free
included the defendant's home. Free, 126 Idaho at 424, 885 P.2d at 383. The State
argued in Free that the finding as to whether forfeiture was excessive, i.e. whether the
property forfeited was unfairly disproportionate to the size of the property actually used
in violation of the provisions, was not required because the defendant's home was not
divisible property. Id. The Free Court rejected this assertion, finding that "the mere fact
that the real property taken is not divisible does not preclude the possibility that the
forfeiture is excessive." Id. at 425, 885 P.2d at 384.
Regardless of whether the property is divisible, I.C. § 37-2809 requires the
district court to determine whether the forfeiture of the property is unfairly
disproportionate to the role actually played by the property in the commission of the
offense.
The State also asserts that the entire vehicle was actually used in the
commission of the offense because each of the parts of the car contributed to the car's
overall function. (Respondent's Brief, p.16.) This argument ignores the actus reus of
the offense actually committed. Ms. Key did not plead guilty to transportation of a
controlled substance (presumably because no such charge exists), but merely pleaded
guilty to possession of a controlled substance. As noted in the Appellant's Brief,
Ms. Key's vehicle played a nominal and merely incidental role in this offense.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.18-21.)

CONCLUSION
Ms. Key respectfully requests that this Court reverse with prejudice the district
court's order granting the State's motion seeking forfeiture of her vehicle.

In the

alternative, she respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
granting the State's motion seeking forfeiture of her vehicle and remand this case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 1 8 ' ~day of February, 2010.
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